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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Restrictive Covenants do not require that a majority vote to terminate 
them must take place on January 1, 2004. This Court in Swenson I did not hold that a 
majority vote to terminate the Covenants must take place on January 1, 2004. Under the 
plain language of the Covenants, at issue in this case, they were already automatically 
renewed on January 1, 2004, when the vote in this case was taken. 
To say that the vote must occur on this one day, January 1st, is too limiting and 
restrictive. The better interpretation of the Covenants' language, consistent with this Court' s 
ruling in Swenson I and that of other jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue; is that 
the majority vote must occur within a reasonable time prior to, but before the renewal date 
of January 1st; and that once voted on, the amendment or change approved, will not take 
effect until the end of the current period, when the Covenants are again due for extension. 
If this Court upholds the opinion issued by the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
matter, then in order for a majority of owners to either amend or terminate restrictive 
covenants recorded on their property, they will be required to meet on one day, that being 
the automatic renewal date, in order to vote on such a change. This is not what was intended 
and the Respondent's misinterpretation regarding the Covenants' language and their 
misunderstanding regarding this Court's ruling in Swenson /, is no justification to allow such 
an opinion to stand. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COVENANTS DO NOT REQUIRE THAT 
THE MAJORITY VOTE TO TERMINATE 
MUST TAKE PLACE ON JANUARY 1,2004 
The Respondents argue that had the drafters of the Covenants chosen to, they 
could have provided an exact time for renewal on January 1st such as 12:01 a.m., but they 
chose not to. However, the drafters of the Covenants did provide a date certain for the 
automatic renewal of the Covenants, that being January 1st. If the drafters intended as 
Respondents argue, that the Covenants could only be terminated by a majority vote on one 
day, that being January 1st, they would have specifically stated that one important date in the 
Covenants, which they did not do. The drafters could have easily provided for a vote of the 
majority owners on January 1st, if this is what they truly intended. 
The Covenants do not require that a majority vote to terminate the Covenants, 
must take place on January 1st. The language in the Covenants, "at which time," refers to 
"January 1, 1994, 'at which time5 said covenants shall be automatically extended." There 
is no provision in the Covenants that January 1st is the only day when a majority vote to 
amend or terminate the Covenants can take place. 
In reality, the interpretation argued by Respondents and applied by the Court 
of Appeals is much more restrictive and limiting than the one proposed by Swensons. The 
Respondents argue that the only time that the majority could have voted to terminate the 
Covenants, which were renewed in this case, is on January 1, 2004. It is unlikely that the 
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drafters intended that this one day would be the only day for such an important vote. The 
Respondents further argue that it is unreasonable to interpret the Covenant's language as 
requiring such a vote prior to January 1, 2004, because the Covenants say it is to be a 
majority vote of the then owners. But as the cases have shown (as admitted by the 
Respondents) other courts have held, under covenants with similar language, that a 
reasonable time to vote before the automatic renewal period commences is implied.1 
Erickson is fully aware of this interpretation as he argued this exact 
interpretation in his Petition for Rehearing filed in February of 2000, with this Court in 
Swenson I. Erickson completely understood the need to vote prior to January 1,2004. As 
he states in his Petition for Rehearing, "It seems unreasonable to expect the residents of the 
Quail Point subdivision to meet on New Years Day, 2004, to amend the restrictive covenants. 
New Years Day is not typically a day when such activities are performed. In addition, it the 
restrictive covenants automatically renewed on January 1, 2004, the covenants would have 
automatically renewed at 12:01 a.m., of that day prior to any meeting" [emphasis added]. 
The Supreme Court rightfully denied the Petition for Rehearing without 
issuing an advisory opinion regarding the correct and required time for a vote to terminate 
*In fact, the courts have recognized this as a reasonable interpretation, given that if 
they wait until the renewal date itself, the covenants will automatically go into effect for 
another renewal period. City ofGulfport v. Wilson, 603 So. 2d 295 (Miss. \992)Scholten 
v. BlackhawkPartners, 999 P.2d 393 (Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meawc 237 So.2d 688 
(La.App. 1970); Wallace's Fourth Southmoor Addition, 874P.2d818, 821 (Okla.App. 
1994).. 
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the Covenants, as there was no specific date given for such a vote to take place. This may 
seem like a harsh remedy to Erickson, but Erickson's confusion and lack of understanding 
regarding the time to vote is not justification for the Court of Appeals to simply rewrite the 
Covenants to provide a January 1st voting date. 
II. THIS COURT IN SWENSONI DID NOT RULE 
THAT THE MAJORITY VOTE TO TERMINATE 
MUST TAKE PLACE ON JANUARY 1, 2004. 
This Court in Swenson I2 did not rule that a majority vote to terminate the 
Covenants would have to take place on January 1, 2004. This Court stated: 
Therefore, the owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at such 
time as the covenants are due for extension. The last time was January 1, 1994, we 
assume that the next such time will be on January 1,2004. 
In Swenson /the Defendants by majority vote tried to terminate the Covenants 
on October 3, 1997. This Court recognized that the majority would not have the power to 
amend or terminate the Covenants, until the Covenants were due for extension, which would 
be on January 1, 2004. Thus, the date of January 1, 2004 referred to by this Court, is not a 
date given for another majority vote to take place, but rather the date when the Covenants 
would be due for extension. This is in line with the Court's ruling in Swenson I that the 
majority can only amend the Covenants at the end of the current renewal period, i.e., when 
they are due for extension. 
2Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 815 (Utah 2000) 
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This Court's ruling in Swenson lis consistent with other jurisdictions, which 
have held that a majority vote cannot terminate or amend restrictive covenants until at the 
end of the extension period, but that the majority vote itself should take place before the 
renewal date, otherwise the automatic renewal will take effect before the vote can be taken 
and the vote will be too late and ineffective to amend or terminate the covenants. City of 
Gulfportv. Wilson, 603 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1992); Scholten v. BlackhawkPartners, 999 P.2d 
393 (Ariz.App. 1995); Failla v. Meaux 237 So.2d 688 (La.App. 1970); Wallace's Fourth 
Southmoor Addition, 874P.2d 818, 821 (Okla.App. 1994). 
Such an interpretation by Swensons does not place the lot owners in an 
impossible position in this case, as Erickson and Limberg argue, as the lot owners can vote 
to amend the Covenants within a reasonable time before the January 1,2004 renewal date. 
This gives the owners more flexibility in voting to amend or to terminate the Covenants, as 
they will not be required to meet and vote on a single day, that being the January 1st renewal 
date. 
Given the interpretation by the Respondents, and the Utah Court of Appeals' 
Opinion in this case, from now on when a majority of lot owners do wish to amend or 
terminate restrictive covenants filed on their property, they will be required to meet and vote 
on one day only, the automatic renewal date, to vote for such a change. A more reasonable 
interpretation, is that the lot owners meet within a reasonable time shortly before the 
automatic renewal date, to vote for any amendment or change; and then as this Court ruled 
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in Swenson /, that change or termination would not take effect until the current term expires 
and the covenants are again due for extension. 
CONCLUSION 
The Restrictive Covenants do not require that a majority vote take place on 
January 1,2004. However, they do provide that they are automatically renewed for another 
10 years on January 1, 2004. Therefore, the vote taken on January 1, 2004 after the 
Covenants were renewed, is of no effect. 
This Court in Swenson I did not hold that the majority vote had to occur on 
January 1, 2004, the date of renewal. Rather, this Court properly held that the majority did 
have the power to amend or terminate the Covenants, but that any such amendment or 
termination would not take effect until the current period had ended and the Covenants were 
again due for extension on January 1, 2004. 
There is only one specific date referenced in the entire Covenants and that is 
January 1st, the date the Covenants automatically renew for another ten years. There is not 
one word in the entire document requiring that any meeting or vote to terminate them, must 
take place on January 1st or any other specific date. It is logical that the drafters intended to 
leave the specific date for such a vote to the discretion of the "then owners." For the courts 
to arbitrarily impose one day, that being January 1st, for such a vote, is an act of rewriting the 
Covenants rather than simply inteipreting the Covenants and the intent of the drafters. 
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The ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals that the majority vote must occur on 
January 1, 2004, misinterprets the language in the Covenants; as well as, this Court's ruling 
in Swenson I. The better interpretation, in line with this Court's ruling in Swenson I and 
other jurisdictions considering this matter, is that the majority vote must occur within a 
reasonable period of time, but before the renewal date of January 1, 2004. 
The ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the district court's decision 
in this case should be reversed; otherwise, the automatic renewal period provided for in the 
Covenants will be of no effect. Furthermore, based on this ruling majority owners seeking 
to amend or terminate restrictive covenants filed on their property will be required to meet 
and vote on the single day indicated as the automatic renewal date. The Respondent's 
misinterpretation should not allow such legal precedence in this state. 
Based on the foregoing, the ruling by the Utah Court of Appeals should be 
reversed. This Court should find that the Covenants do not require the vote to be taken on 
January 1,2004; and that this Court did not so hold in Swenson L Therefore, the vote taken 
on January 1, 2004, occurred after the Covenants were already automatically renewed and 
was thus ineffective to terminate the Covenants. 
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